Bonus Pools and the Informativeness Principle by Imhof, Lorens & Kräkel, Matthias
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 · www.sfbtr15.de 
Universität Mannheim · Freie Universität Berlin · Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin · Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn · Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung Mannheim 
 
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Klaus M. Schmidt · Department of Economics · University of Munich · D-80539 Munich, 
Phone: +49(89)2180 2250 · Fax: +49(89)2180 3510 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* University of Bonn 
** University of Bonn 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged. 
 
Discussion Paper No. 413 
 
Bonus Pools and the 
Informativeness Principle 
 
Lorens Imhof * 
Matthias Kräkel ** 
 
 
Bonus Pools and the Informativeness Principle*
Lorens Imhof, University of Bonn**
and
Matthias Kräkel, University of Bonn***
Abstract
Previous work on moral-hazard problems has shown that, under certain conditions,
bonus contracts create optimal individual incentives for risk-neutral workers. In
our paper we demonstrate that, if a rm employs at least two workers, it may
further benet from combining worker compensation via a bonus-pool contract
and relative performance evaluation. Such combination leads to saved rents under
a wide class of luck distributions. In addition, if the employer is wealth-constrained,
complementing individual bonus contracts by the possibility of pooling bonuses can
increase the set of implementable e¤ort levels. All our results hold even though
workersoutputs are technically and stochastically independent so that, in view
of Holmstroms informativeness principle, individual bonus contracts would be
expected to dominate bonus-pool contracts.
Key words: contract; hazard rate; informativeness principle; limited liability; relative
performance.
JEL classication: C72; D86.
* We would like to thank Jörg Budde, Florian Englmaier, Thomas Gall, Oliver
Gürtler, Eugen Kovac, Daniel Krähmer, Benny Moldovanu, Daniel Müller, Klaus
Sandmann, Urs Schweizer, Christian Seel, Tymon Tatur, the participants of the
"Young ResearchersWorkshop on Contests and Tournaments", in Dortmund,
the participants of the annual conference of the German Economic Association
(VfS), in Frankfurt, the participants of the GESY conference (Governance and
the E¢ ciency of Economic Systems) in Bonn, and the participants of the BGSE
Micro Workshop for helpful comments. Financial support by the DFG, grant
SFB/TR 15, is gratefully acknowledged.
** Lorens Imhof, Department of Economics and Hausdor¤ Center for Mathe-
matics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 2442, 53113 Bonn, Germany, phone:
+49-228-739265, fax: +49-228-735050, e-mail: limhof@uni-bonn.de.
*** Matthias Kräkel, Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Ade-
nauerallee 2442, 53113 Bonn, Germany, phone: +49-228-739211, fax: +49-228-
739210, e-mail: m.kraekel@uni-bonn.de.
1
1 Introduction
In a moral-hazard problem, incentives can be created by using either a carrot
or a stick. In a world where workers are protected by limited liability, only
carrots may be available. We show that the employer often can reduce rents
paid to the worker by using one big carrot in the form of a bonus pool, in-
stead of several small carrots that serve as individual bonus payments. Our
results hold even when workers perform completely independent tasks. On
the surface, this seems to contradict Holmstroms informativeness principle1
that bonus pools are inferior to individual bonuses because relative perfor-
mance information is noisier. When the rm faces constraints on the size of
the bonuses it can pay out, however, the advantage of using one large car-
rot frequently outweighs the informational advantage of using several small
carrots.
Individual bonus contracts are not only frequently observed in practice
(e.g., Joseph and Kalwani 1998), but are also often optimal in a second-best
setting (e.g., Demougin and Fluet 1998, Oyer 2000, Herweg et al. 2010).
Bonus contracts specify a certain threshold or quota together with a wage
premium that is paid to a worker if his output exceeds the given quota. If
workers are risk neutral and the monotone likelihood ratio property holds, it
is optimal for the employer to create high powered incentives by combining
a very large quota with a very large wage premium.
In this paper, we analyze under which conditions a rm that employs
at least two workers can benet from pooling incentives. Under a bonus
pool, the rm species a xed amount of money to be distributed among
the workers according to relative performance. In addition to the bonus
payments, the bonus-pool contract species a minimum distance or gap by
which one worker must outperform his co-workers to get a high bonus.2 This
gap works similar as the quota of an individual bonus contract because it
1See Holmstrom (1979, 1982).
2Alternatively, we can speak of a tournament scheme that is complemented by a gap;
see Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983), pp. 30-32.
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inuences both incentives and the probability with which bonus payments
are made to the workers.
Since the workerstasks are neither technically nor stochastically related,
at rst sight it does not make sense to pool workersincentives: as relative
performance is less informative about individual e¤ort choice than absolute
performance, individual incentives should always work better than collective
ones according to Holmstroms informativeness principle. In other words,
compared to individual bonuses, a certain e¤ort level can only be imple-
mented via a bonus pool with relative performance evaluation if the bonus
pool species a su¢ ciently larger wage premium. The extra money is needed
to replace missing incentives stemming from the fact that the impact of indi-
vidual e¤ort on the performance measure is less strong. Hence, bonus pools
should be too expensive and leave too much rents to the workers.
We o¤er two reasons why a bonus-pool contract can nevertheless beat
individual bonus contracts: (1) in case of an increasing hazard rate, the
employer prefers the highest possible threshold (together with large bonus
payments) under both types of contract. If the thresholds are bounded above
(e.g., due to a collective agreement between an industry wide union and an
employer association), the employer will choose this upper bound for either
contract. However, the e¤ective threshold under a bonus pool with rela-
tive performance evaluation is considerably larger than the threshold under
individual bonuses since under a bonus pool each worker has to beat the
upper bound and his opponents which leads to a lower probability of paying
a large bonus and, hence, to reduced worker rents. (2) Under a bonus pool,
several workers compete for only one large bonus payment, whereas under
individual bonuses each worker has to be incentivized by a separate bonus. If
the employer is nancially constrained, one big bonus pool may work better
than several individual bonuses, which have to be rather small due to the
employers limited wealth. In addition to saving rents, pooling bonuses may
increase the set of implementable e¤orts. We show that this second feature
of bonus pools is independent of the luck distributions hazard rate.
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The assumption of an increasing hazard rate is a standard one in the
adverse-selection literature.3 In that work, the monotone-hazard-rate prop-
erty refers to the distribution of playerstypes, whereas in our setting this
property refers to the distribution of exogenous luck. However, all our results
will completely remain the same if we reinterpret the random luck variable as
the individual ability of a worker, characterizing his type and being unknown
to each player ex ante. This reinterpretation only translates the standard
moral-hazard setting into a moral-hazard model with symmetric ability un-
certainty (see, e.g., Holmstrom 1999). Furthermore, irrespective of whether
the random variable denotes luck or unknown ability in our model, the hazard
rate technically works very similar compared to the adverse-selection models
as it represents the trade-o¤ between inducing incentives and the magnitude
of expected payment (see Poblete and Spulber 2012). To sum up, accepting
the monotone-hazard-rate property for the whole class of contract-theoretic
models including moral hazard would imply that a bonus-pool contract
outperforms individual bonus contracts under the assumption of limited lia-
bility.
Our paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the
related literature. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 considers a
specic example to illustrate our main nding on the optimality of bonus
pools over individual bonuses. In Section 5, we derive the optimal bonus-
pool contract. Section 6 compares optimal individual bonus contracts with
the optimal bonus-pool contract. Section 7 discusses the robustness of our
main ndings. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to the previous literature on individual bonuses and
bonus pools. Demougin and Fluet (1998), Wolfstetter (1999, pp. 288294),
3See, e.g., the textbooks by Tirole (1988), p. 156, Wolfstetter (1999), p. 216, Bolton
and Dewatripont (2005), p. 87, and Hermalin (2005), p. 102.
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and Oyer (2000) investigate the optimal contract in a second-best setting.
They show that the optimal contract under risk neutral workers with limited
liability is an individual bonus contract that attaches a xed payment to a
certain quota. Demougin and Fluet consider a setting with discrete outcomes
and assume that the monotone likelihood ratio property holds. As a conse-
quence, a bonus contract becomes optimal where the agent only receives a
positive payment under the most favorable outcome. Similar to Oyer (2000),
we assume outcome to be continuous. Of course, a contract that pays a
positive bonus only under the most favorable outcome would now get into
existence and characterization problems since the probability of the most
favorable outcome is zero. We introduce two alternatives to get rid of this
problem. First, we assume that the quota is bounded above. Alternatively,
we follow the idea of Innes (1990) and assume that the principal is wealth-
constrained. While the rst alternative prevents tying a bonus to extremely
high outcomes, the second alternative limits the magnitude of the optimal
bonus payment.
Bonus-pool contracts have been discussed in the literature on the tradi-
tional personnel policy of Japanese rms and in the managerial-accounting
literature. Kanemoto and MacLeod (1989, 1992) show that bonus-pool con-
tracts solve the problem of subjective performance evaluation of Japanese
rms. Baiman and Rajan (1995) also emphasize that bonus-pool contracts
enable rms to make use of subjective performance evaluation. Rajan and
Reichelstein (2006) and Budde (2007) analyze the optimal design of bonus-
pool contracts under subjective (and additional objective) performance mea-
sures. Contrary to these papers, we assume that output is described by a
continuous variable, which conveys cardinal information on worker perfor-
mance. Moreover, we solve for the optimal e¤ort level and show that the
optimal individual bonus contract and the optimal bonus-pool contract in-
deed lead to di¤erent e¤orts. All the previous papers on bonus pools do not
directly contrast individual bonus contracts with a bonus-pool contract.
Beside theoretical contributions, the managerial-accounting literature also
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o¤ers empirical work on bonus pools (e.g., Healy 1985; Gaver et al. 1995;
Holthausen et al. 1995; Guidry et al. 1999). These studies mainly focus
on how managers select accounting procedures to inuence the magnitude of
the bonus pools. Murphy and Oyer (2001) use data on management com-
pensation to analyze the role of discretion in the distribution of bonus pools.
Bonus pools are not only used to incentivize managers. From 2007 to 2010,
New York City o¤ered its teachers a bonus pool of $57 million as incentive
pay in addition to standard wages (Martinez 2011). Goodman and Turner
(2013) empirically analyze the incentive e¤ects of this bonus pool. They nd
that the bonus pool does not have a large impact on student achievement.
The lack of success can be explained by the fact that the bonus pool was dis-
tributed among the schools according to performance, but within each school
all teachers equally shared the performance pay, thus leading to possible free
riding. All the examples mentioned in this paragraph show that the respec-
tive employers were able to use individual bonus contracts but they preferred
bonus pools. The studies do not explain this preference. The advantage of
bonus pools highlighted in our paper may be one reason, but there also ex-
ist further benets of bonus pools which may be decisive as well (e.g., the
commitment to an upper bound on overall labor costs).
Since the bonus-pool contract uses relative performance, our paper is also
related to the literature on tournaments (e.g., Lazear and Rosen 1981; Green
and Stokey 1983; Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz 1983). In particular, there are strong
parallels to tournaments with a gap (Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz 1983, pp. 30-32;
Eden 2007; Imhof and Kräkel 2011), because the bonus-pool contract also
uses a gap or minimum distance to ne-tune incentives and the workers
probability of obtaining the high payment. The gap is somewhat related
to handicaps, which are already addressed by the seminal paper of Lazear
and Rosen (1981). Handicaps are imposed on stronger players to balance
competition and, hence, to improve incentives. A gap, however, has to be
beaten by all contestants. Moreover, the gap decreases incentives under an
increasing hazard rate, but is nevertheless preferred by the employer to reduce
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worker rents.
Our paper is not the rst one showing that an employer may prefer an
incentive scheme that appears suboptimal according to Holmstroms infor-
mativeness principle. Itoh (2004), Goel and Thakor (2006), Englmaier and
Wambach (2010) and Bartling (2011) analyze incentive schemes in a situa-
tion where workers have other regarding preferences. Since inequity averse
workers have to be compensated for their inequity costs under a binding par-
ticipation constraint, it can be benecial for the employer to base incentives
on a less informative performance measure if the resulting incentive scheme
leads to lower inequity costs. In particular, Englmaier and Wambach (2010)
point out that an employer may prefer team incentives although they violate
the informativeness principle since workerstasks are unrelated. Paying team
bonuses to workers is optimal because they result into less unequal payments.
Weinschenk (2009, chapter IV) and Lang (2009) combine a principal-agent
setting with ambiguity aversion and show that the optimal contract can lead
to a violation of the informativeness principle. If the agents ambiguity aver-
sion is large enough, it will be optimal for the principal not to use an infor-
mative signal for creating incentives. Hence, the optimal contract boils down
to a constant wage.
To the best of our knowledge, there only exists one paper that also com-
pares individual incentive contracts with a bonus-pool contract, namely Koch
and Peyrache (2011). Koch and Peyrache consider a two-period model with
binary e¤orts, binary outputs and binary agent types. All players are risk
neutral and agents are protected by limited liability. In this setting, it can be
optimal for a principal to conceal information on agentstypes to outsiders.
For that purpose, the principal designs an opaque organization that makes
agentsperformance unobservable to the labor market so that an initially
objective performance measure becomes subjective. Such policy leads to the
following trade-o¤: on the one hand, uncertainty about agents types cre-
ates career-concerns incentives (see Holmstrom 1999), which is benecial for
the principal. On the other hand, unveriability of individual performance
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renders individual bonus contracts impossible. However, the principal can
rely on the self-commitment property of a bonus pool to create incentives.
Under certain conditions, the principal prefers an opaque organization that
leads to a combination of career-concerns incentives and a bonus pool to a
transparent organization which allows for the use of individual bonus con-
tracts but eliminates career concerns. In our paper, we study under which
conditions a bonus-pool contract dominates individual bonus contracts even
in the absence of additional career-concerns incentives.
3 The Model
We consider a situation where an employer must hire two workers in order
to run a rm. The three players are risk neutral. We assume that worker
i (i = 1; 2) chooses non-negative e¤ort ei to increase the employers prots.
The employer observes the veriable or objective performance measure4
xi (ei) = ei + i (1)
with 1 and 2 as random variables, denoting either noise or luck. The vari-
ables 1 and 2 are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with den-
sity f and cdf F , satisfying limjj!1 f () = 0. We assume that
R1
 1 f
2 () d <
1 to guarantee that 1   2 has a continuous density g with corresponding
cdf G. Both technical assumptions on f are satised by all well-known den-
sities. The probability distributions are common knowledge. The employer
can neither observe ei nor i so that we have a typical moral-hazard problem.
Exerting e¤ort ei entails costs c (ei) for worker i with c (0) = c0 (0) = 0 and
c0 (ei) ; c00 (ei) ; c000 (ei) > 0 for ei > 0.5 Let the workersreservation values be
4See, e.g., Hermalin (2005), 155-156, on such a setting with an additively separable
performance measure xi (ei). In the main part of the paper, we follow this state-space
formulation; see Hart and Holmstrom (1987), 77-78, and the cited literature on this ap-
proach. In the online appendix, we switch to the parameterized distribution formulation
(Hart and Holmstrom 1987, 78) and show that our qualitative nding still holds.
5The assumption c000 (ei) > 0 is often used in moral-hazard models with limited liability
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u = 0. Workers are nancially constrained so that their wage payments must
be non-negative.6 Each worker maximizes expected net income, consisting of
expected wage payment minus e¤ort costs, whereas the employer maximizes
e1 + e2 minus expected wage payments.
In the following, we will compare two di¤erent contracts that are fre-
quently used in practice. On the one hand, the employer can o¤er an indi-
vidual bonus contract (b^Hi; b^Li; ^i) to each worker i (i = 1; 2). Worker i will
receive the high bonus b^Hi if his performance measure xi (ei) exceeds a certain
quota ^i; otherwise worker i gets the low bonus b^Li (< b^Hi). On the other
hand, the employer can x a bonus pool bH + bL and o¤er both workers a
joint bonus-pool contract (bH ; bL; ) based on relative performance. In anal-
ogy to the individual bonus contract, the variable   0 denotes a threshold
or gap by which worker i must outperform worker j in order to get the high
bonus bH . In other words, worker i will only receive bH if xi (ei) > xj (ej)+.
In that case, the inferior worker j obtains the low bonus bL (< bH). Like
^i in the individual bonus contract,  is used to ne-tune incentives in the
bonus-pool contract. As mentioned before, workers are protected by limited
liability, implying b^Hi; b^Li; bH ; bL  0. Recall that we assume noise to be
i.i.d.. If 1 and 2 were not independent, then bonus pools would be desirable
because they eliminate common noise (Holmstrom 1982, Green and Stokey
1983). Our story for why bonus pools may be desirable is completely di¤er-
ent. We assume 1 and 2 are independent to focus the model on our main
point.
To avoid the technical problems mentioned in Section 2, we consider two
alternative restrictions. As a rst alternative, we impose the restriction that
the employer can only choose nite thresholds ^i;  2 [0; ] with  > 0 and
that f and g are strictly positive on [0;  + "] for some " > 0. In Germany,
for example, industry-wide unions negotiate collective agreements with the
employers association concerning general conditions for employment con-
to guarantee strict concavity of the employers objective function; see, e.g., Schmitz (2005),
730.
6Alternatively, we can assume that legal minimum wages prohibit negative wages.
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tracts. We can imagine that such collective agreements restrict thresholds to
a certain upper bound  > 0. As a second alternative, we follow the sugges-
tion of Innes (1990) and assume that the employer is wealth-constrained and
possesses only capital K > 0 when o¤ering the workers a contract.
The timeline is the usual one in moral-hazard models: First, the employer
o¤ers the workers either individual bonus contracts (b^Hi; b^Li; ^i) or a bonus-
pool contract (bH ; bL; ). Then, the workers can accept or reject the contract
o¤er. If the workers accept, they will choose non-negative e¤ort levels. Next,
the random variables 1 and 2 are realized. Finally, the employer and the
workers receive their payo¤s according to the contract.
4 An Illustrative Example
In this example, we assume each i is normally distributed with mean zero
and variance 2, and that the employer seeks to implement a certain e¤ort
level.
The analysis in the following sections will show that the employer opti-
mally chooses b^Li = bL = 0, since workers have zero reservation values and
are protected by limited liability. Under individual bonus contracts, worker i
exerts optimal e¤ort that equates his marginal e¤ort costs and marginal ex-
pected wage payments. Thus, the incentive constraint for individual bonus
contracts can be written as
c0 (ei) = b^Hi  f (^i   ei) : (2)
Under a bonus-pool contract, again worker is optimal e¤ort equates marginal
e¤ort costs and marginal expected wage payments. However, now wage pay-
ments depend on relative performance and, hence, the corresponding density
g, which is again normal but has doubled variance (see, e.g., Wolfstetter 1999,
306). In a symmetric equilibrium, the two homogeneous workers choose iden-
tical e¤orts so that the incentive constraint under the bonus-pool contract
reads as
c0 (ei) = bH  g(): (3)
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The comparison of the incentive constraints (2) and (3) shows why, in
agreement with Holmstroms informativeness principle, individual bonuses
seem to be better suited than a bonus pool to motivate workers. To imple-
ment a certain e¤ort level at minimum costs, the employer chooses ^i = ei in
(2) and  = 0 in (3). Hence, the bonus pool boils down to a simple tourna-
ment in which the worker with the higher performance receives bH as winner
prize. Inserting ^i = ei and  = 0 leads to
c0 (ei) = b^Hi  f (0) and c0 (ei) = bH  g(0)
with f (0) = 1=
p
22 and g (0) = 1=
p
42 and, thus, f (0) > g (0). Intu-
itively, the relative performance measure xi (ei)  xj (ej) is less precise than
the performance measure xi (ei) due to the doubled variance so that the
density g is atter than f . As a consequence, for the same bonus payment
b^Hi = bH , marginal incentives are always lower under a bonus pool compared
to individual bonuses since the impact of individual e¤ort on performance
outcome is less strong under relative performance evaluation due to a larger
impact of noise.
Recall that the employer wants each worker to exert a certain e¤ort level.
Now suppose that the employer is wealth-constrained and possesses limited
capital K. Thus, the highest possible e¤ort that can be induced under indi-
vidual bonuses, e^, is implicitly described by
c0 (e^) =
K
2
 f (0) ;
whereas a bonus pool leads to maximum e¤ort e of each worker being de-
scribed by
c0 (e) = K  g(0):
Since K
2
 f (0) < K  g(0), for any xed K, the maximum e¤ort that can
be implemented via individual bonuses is less than that which can be im-
plemented by a bonus pool. As the example illustrates, bonus pools only
use one collective payment to incentivize multiple workers which can lead to
a crucial advantage under the assumption of a wealth-constrained employer
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that dominates the disadvantage suggested by Holmstroms informativeness
principle.
5 The Optimal Bonus-Pool Contract
In the following, the game is solved by backwards induction: First, we con-
sider the workerse¤ort choices for a given bonus-pool contract (bH ; bL; )
under the assumption that both workers participate. Then, we derive the op-
timal contract (bH ; b

L; 
) that satises the workersparticipation constraints,
the incentive constraints and the limited-liability constraints.
We show in the appendix that the employer optimally withholds the com-
plete bonus pool in case of a tie, i.e., if jx1 (e1)  x2 (e2)j  , and that in
equilibrium the workers choose e¤orts e1 = e2 =: e implicitly described by
c0 (e) = (bH   bL) g () : (4)
Equation (4) shows that, in equilibrium, each worker exerts the e¤ort that
equates marginal costs and the expected marginal gain from winning the
relative performance evaluation. Intuitively, since each one gets at least bL
irrespective of whether he wins, only the additional bonus payment bH   bL
creates incentives.
At the rst stage of the game, the employer chooses the optimal bonus-
pool contract (bH ; b

L; 
) that maximizes7
2e  2 [1 G ()]  (bL + bH)
subject to the incentive constraint (4), the participation constraint EUi(e)
 0 and the limited-liability constraint bL; bH  0. To solve for the optimal
bonus-pool contract, we use the fact that the participation constraint is al-
ways satised: Each worker can ensure himself a non-negative expected util-
ity and, thus, at least his reservation value by accepting any contract with
non-negative payments and choosing zero e¤ort. As a direct consequence, the
7We have P (jx1 (e1)  x2 (e2)j > ) = 2 [1 G ()].
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employer optimally chooses bL = 0 since positive payments would increase
his expected labor costs and decrease workersincentives (see (4)).
The employer thus solves
max
e;;bH
2e  2 [1 G ()] bH (4)= max
e;
2 

e  1 G ()
g ()
c0 (e)

: (5)
According to (5), the employer faces the following trade-o¤ when choosing
the optimal gap : On the one hand, he should choose a very large  to
reduce the probability of paying out bH (implementation-cost e¤ect). On the
other hand, (4) indicates that a very large gap may also reduce incentives
(incentive e¤ect). If, for example, the convolution g is a normal density, g ()
will decrease from the mean to the tail.
Let r := g= [1 G] denote the hazard rate of the di¤erence i   j, and
(e; ) the solution to problem (5), i.e., the employer chooses the gap  and
implements e¤ort e. We obtain the following result:8
Proposition 1 The employer o¤ers the bonus-pool contract (bH ; b

L; 
) with
bL = 0.
(a) Suppose  is bounded above by . Then the employer chooses  2
argmax2[0;] r (). Log-concavity of g implies optimality of  = . For each
worker the employer implements e¤ort e 2 argmaxe e  c0 (e) =r () via the
high bonus bH = c
0 (e) =g ().
(b) Suppose r is increasing and the employer has limited wealth K > 0.
Dene e > 0 by c0(e) = Kg(0). Then e maximizes e   c0(e)=r((e)) over
(0; e] and  =  (e), where (e) := maxf  0 : Kg() = c0(e)g. The
employer chooses the high bonus bH = c
0 (e) =g () = K.
Problem (5) shows that the employer wants to maximize the value of the
hazard rate to trade o¤ the implementation-cost e¤ect against the incentive
e¤ect. This observation immediately leads to the results of Proposition 1(a).
The hazard rate r can have various shapes.9 If it is monotonic we will obtain
8All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
9See, e.g., Glaser (1980).
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a clear-cut result: In case of a monotonically decreasing (increasing) hazard
rate the employer forgoes a gap (chooses the maximum possible gap ).
We know that the convolution g has a peak at zero, which is also its
global maximum.10 If the convolution is single-peaked, the hazard rate r =
g= [1 G] is monotonically increasing in the negative domain up to the peak
at zero since the numerator is increasing and the denominator decreasing. To
the right of the peak the hazard rate will be still increasing if the decreasing
denominator dominates the decreasing numerator. Proposition 1(a) includes
this case, in which the implementation-cost e¤ect dominates the incentive
e¤ect. This result holds in particular for the class of log-concave densities
g (e.g., for the normal distribution).11 For these distributions, the employer
prefers  =  to minimize the probability of paying out the high bonus,
2 [1 G ()]. Since g () and, hence, workersincentives become smaller
the larger the gap , the employer has to compensate for the incentive e¤ect
by choosing an appropriately large bonus bH (see the incentive constraint
(4)). Recall from the beginning of this paragraph that  = 0 maximizes
workers incentives. In contrast, under a log-concave density the employer
minimizes incentives by the optimal gap  in order to minimize expected
implementation costs as well.
Proposition 1(b) also refers to the case of an increasing hazard rate,
but now the employers limited wealth K restricts the set of feasible (e; )-
combinations when solving (5). Technically, the condition limjj!1 f () = 0,
which is satised by all well-known densities, together with the incentive
constraint (4) makes the employers limited-liability condition binding at the
optimum (see (13) in the appendix):
c0 (e) = K  g () : (6)
The solution to the employers problem now has two steps. First, for imple-
menting a certain e¤ort level e at lowest possible cost, the employer chooses
the largest corresponding gap  = (e) that satises equation (6). Second,
10See Lemma 1 in the proof of Proposition 1(b).
11See Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005), section 6, for further examples.
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among all feasible (e; (e))-combinations the employer chooses the combina-
tion that solves (5). Recall from part (a) of Proposition 1 that if the hazard
rate is increasing and the gap bounded above, the employer wants to com-
bine a very large gap with a very large bonus bH . Part (b) shows that if the
employer is wealth-constrained we will have a similar solution since for given
e¤ort e the employer still prefers the highest feasible gap (i.e., a gap that
satises (6)).
6 Comparison with Individual Bonus Con-
tracts
In the following, we will show that (1) although workers tasks are com-
pletely unrelated and (2) although a bonus-pool contract in combination
with relative performance evaluation leads to a less precise measure, the
optimal bonus-pool contract can nevertheless dominate optimal individual
bonus contracts.
The optimal bonus contract for each single worker i, (b^H ; b^

L; ^
),12 can
be derived in two steps. First, workerse¤ort choice is analyzed for a given
contract (b^H ; b^L; ^). Second, the employer anticipates worker behavior and
chooses the optimal contract that maximizes his expected net prots. We
start with the step where each worker i (i = 1; 2) maximizes his expected
utility
b^L +b^  P (xi (ei)  ^)  c (ei) = b^L +b^  [1  F (^   ei)]  c (ei)
with b^ := b^H  b^L denoting the bonus spread, and F as cdf and f as density
of the i.i.d. random variables 1 and 2. As Oyer (2000) we assume that the
workers objective function is well-behaved and that optimal e¤ort choice can
12Workers are homogeneous and do not interact. The employer, therefore, prefers the
same optimal e¤ort for each worker and chooses identical contracts. Hence, we suppress
the subscript "i" to simplify notation.
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be described by the rst-order condition
b^  f (^   ei)  c0 (ei) = 0, b^ = c
0 (ei)
f (^   ei) : (7)
In stage 1, the employer optimally designs the individual bonus contract.
In analogy to the optimal bonus-pool contract, the workerslimited-liability
constraint implies the participation constraint as u = c (0) = 0, and the
employer chooses b^L = 0 to minimize his labor costs. Thus, for each worker
the employer solves
max
b^;^;ei
ei   b^H  P (xi (ei)  ^) s.t. (7)
= max
^;ei
ei   1  F (^   ei)
f (^   ei) c
0 (ei) : (8)
Problems (5) and (8) look similar because in each case the employer wants
to maximize a hazard rate: for the bonus-pool contract the hazard rate
r = g=(1   G) of 1   2, and for the individual bonus contract the hazard
rate r = f=(1  F ) of i. For an intuitive explanation of why the employer
seeks to maximize the hazard rate consider worker i evaluating e¤ort level
ei under an individual bonus contract (b^H ; b^L; ^). To obtain the high bonus,
the worker must have some amount of luck: i  ^   ei. Assuming he
has the required amount of luck, the worker is interested in the conditional
probability that his performance will exceed the threshold signicantly, say,
xi(ei) > ^ +  with some small  > 0. The probability is related to the
hazard rate by P (xi(ei) > ^ + ji  ^   ei)  1   r(^   ei). The larger
this probability, the weaker the incentive for the worker to increase his e¤ort.
This e¤ect explains why a large value of r(^   ei) is in the interest of the
employer. A similar argument applies in the case of a bonus-pool contract.
A comparison of individual bonus contracts and bonus-pool contracts
leads, in view of (5) and (8), to a comparison of the hazard rates r and
r. Given that the thresholds of both contract types are equally constrained
(i.e., ; ^ 2 [0; ]), the optimal bonus-pool contract will dominate individual
contracts if r()  r() for all   0, that is, if 1  2 is smaller than 1 in
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the hazard rate order, see e.g. Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007). A su¢ cient
condition for this to be the case is that i has an increasing hazard rate.
Proposition 2 Suppose the density f is log-concave or, more generally, the
hazard rate r of i is increasing.
(a) Suppose 1 and 2 are non-negative and the thresholds are bounded
above (i.e., ; ^ 2 [0; ]). Then the optimal bonus-pool contract will dominate
all individual bonus contracts. If r is strictly increasing, using the optimal
bonus pool instead of two bonus contracts will lead to a strict improvement.
(b) Suppose the employer has limited wealth K > 0. Suppose further that
the hazard rate r of 1   2 is increasing as well and that e¤ort e > 0 is
implementable by either contract. Let
(e) := max f  0 : Kg() = c0(e)g ;
and ^(e) := max

^  0 : K
2
f(^   e) = c0(e)

:
Then the bonus-pool contract implementing e at minimal costs sets (e), the
individual bonus contract implementing e at minimal costs sets ^(e), and the
bonus pool is less costly if and only if r ((e)) > r (^(e)  e).
Proposition 2(a) deals with the scenario considered by Kim (1997), Oyer
(2000), Poblete and Spulber (2012) and others who assume that the i can
only take non-negative values. The authors motivate their setting by assum-
ing that the performance measure xi describes physical output or realized
sales so that the exclusion of negative realizations seems reasonable. Part (a)
points out that for a wide class of probability distributions, including trun-
cated normal and uniform distributions, the optimal bonus contract can be
strictly improved by combining workersincentives via a bonus-pool contract.
Whereas this result holds for exogenously constrained thresholds, Proposi-
tion 2(b) refers to endogenous thresholds and does not restrict the possible
realizations of the i. According to (b), a nding similar to part (a) will hold
for thresholds that are endogenously constrained by the employers limited
wealth if the optimal thresholds for the two contract types do not di¤er too
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much. Then, the hazard-rate-order result of part (a) (i.e., r () > r () for
all   0, see the proof in the appendix) is still decisive for the comparison
between the bonus pool and individual bonus contracts and the employer
can implement a certain e¤ort level at lower expected costs by using a bonus
pool instead of two individual bonus contracts.
Against the background of Holmstroms informativeness principle, the re-
sults of Proposition 2 seem surprising as the workerstasks are neither tech-
nically nor stochastically related.13 A bonus-pool contract uses relative per-
formance evaluation, and the relative performance measure x1 (e1) x2 (e2) is
less precise than the measure xi (ei) used by an individual bonus contract.14
Correspondingly, it is plausible that the implementation of a given e¤ort level
requires a bonus pool, bH , that is larger than the total bonus, 2b^H , o¤ered
under two individual contracts.
However, for implementing a certain e¤ort level e, it is not the size of
the bonus, but the expected costs, that the employer is primarily interested
in. The probability that the bonus pool is paid out is 2[1   G()] and the
probability that the individual bonus is paid out is 1 F (^ e). The expected
costs under the bonus-pool contract and under the individual contracts are
therefore 2bH [1   G()] and 2b^H [1   F (^   e)]. As argued above, given
e¤ort e, the corresponding bonus pool bH should be larger than total bonus
2b^H . However, the implementation-cost e¤ect mentioned in Section 5, which
focuses on the probability of paying out bH or 2b^H , respectively, works into
the opposite direction. Especially, if the i are non-negative, 1   G() <
1   F ()  1   F (   e). Hence, the probability of paying out the bonus
pool tends to be smaller than the probability of paying the high bonuses to
both workers under individual contracts. Proposition 2 provides conditions
under which the implementation-cost e¤ect is strong enough to dominate the
incentive downside so that the employer prefers a bonus pool to individual
13See Holmstrom (1982) and Mookherjee (1984) for the multi-agent case.
14V ar (1   2) = 2V ar (i), so that the relative performance measure is half as precise
as the absolute performance measure for a single worker, xi (ei).
18
bonuses.15 Since workers are protected by limited liability and earn positive
rents, a dominance of the bonus-pool contract over individual bonus contracts
implies that the employer benets from reduced worker rents when pooling
incentives.
Less technically, the advantage of a bonus pool in connection with rela-
tive performance evaluation can be explained as follows. The previous results
have shown that, due to the increasing hazard rate, the employer wants to
combine a large threshold with large bonus payments under both individual
bonuses and a bonus pool. The latter one has two advantages in this situa-
tion. First, if the quota for individual bonuses is exogenously constrained to
^ = , the employer will strictly benet from using  as minimum distance
and letting the workers compete against each other via relative performance
evaluation. Competition implies that each worker now has to beat  and his
opponent which leads to an extension of the original threshold and, thereby,
a reduction of worker rents via the implementation-cost e¤ect. Second, un-
der a bonus pool several workers compete for only one large bonus payment,
whereas under individual bonuses each worker has to be incentivized by a
separate wage premium. If the employer is wealth-constrained, one big bonus
pool may work better than several individual bonuses, which are rather small
since the employer is nancially constrained.
In Proposition 2 we did not address the possibility that the employer
may be unable to implement certain e¤ort levels under one of the contracts.
However, if the employer is wealth-constrained it may be the case that com-
bining a large threshold with a high bonus payment is not feasible since the
employers amount of liability is too small. Considering the implementability
of e¤ort under the two types of contracts leads to the following results, which
do not impose restrictions on the hazard rates:
Proposition 3 Suppose the employer has limited wealth K > 0.
15An example with a specic distribution can be used to illustrate the previous argu-
ments and the magnitude by which the bonus-pool contract may outperform the bonus
contract; see the online appendix.
19
(a) Let 1; 2 2 [0;1). There exists e0 2 [0;1], which depends only on f
and K, but not on c, such that the following holds: (a1) Every nonnegative
e¤ort level e < e0 that can be implemented by individual bonus contracts
can also be implemented by a bonus-pool contract. (a2) Every nite e¤ort
level e > e0 that can be implemented by a bonus-pool contract can also be
implemented by individual bonus contracts.
(b) If an e¤ort level e satises
max
^
f (^   e) K
2
< c0 (e)  g (0)K; (9)
this e¤ort will be implementable by a bonus pool but not by individual bonus
contracts.
According to Proposition 3(a), there exists a critical e¤ort level, e0, so
that some smaller (larger) e¤ort levels may be implementable by a bonus pool
(individual bonuses) but not by individual bonuses (a bonus pool).16 Part
(b) of Proposition 3 does not restrict the possible realizations of the i. It
shows how the employers limited wealth, K, favors the implementability of
e¤ort by a bonus pool compared to individual bonuses and gives a su¢ cient
condition for an e¤ort level to be only implementable by a bonus pool.
The intuition for our ndings is the following. The incentive constraints
(4) and (7) show that, under either contract, both the bonus payment in case
of success (i.e., bH and b^H , respectively) and the marginal winning probability
(i.e., g () and f (^   e), respectively) have to be su¢ ciently large for the
implementation of a certain e¤ort level. The bonus payment in case of success
is restricted by the employers limited-liability constraint, which depends on
K under a bonus pool and on K=2 under individual bonuses. Since the
amount of liability per worker is twice as high under a bonus pool than under
individual bonuses, the employer may implement certain e¤orts solely via the
bonus pool if this liability advantage is not outweighed by a su¢ ciently larger
marginal winning probability.17
16An illustrating example can be requested from the authors.
17g (0) = max g () < max f () since under the convolution the total probability mass
is now distributed over the doubled support.
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Part (b) of Proposition 3 captures the main idea of the example in Section
4, which deals with normally distributed i, leading to max^ f (^   e) K2 <
g (0)K. Thus, for small values of K, many e¤orts are not implementable by
either contract. For larger values of K, there exists a range of e¤ort levels
that are implementable via a bonus pool but not via individual bonuses. If
K is su¢ ciently large, many moderate e¤ort levels can be implemented by
either using a bonus pool or individual bonuses.
To sum up, the results of Section 6 have shown that complementing indi-
vidual bonus contracts by the possibility of pooling incentives may not only
save rents for the employer but also increase the set of implementable e¤ort
levels.
7 Discussion
We have shown under which conditions a rm that employs two workers
prefers a bonus pool to individual bonus contracts. This dominance of a
bonus-pool contract will still hold if we extend our setting to the case of
more than two workers. In that case, the employer can divide the set of
workers into pairs of two workers whose incentives are combined by a bonus-
pool contract. If the number of workers, say n, is even, there will be n=2
bonus pools; if n is odd, the employer can design (n  1) =2 bonus pools and
one individual bonus contract. If pooling of more than two workers does not
lead to worker discouragement when competing for the bonus payments, the
outcome of optimal bonus-pool contracts can be even further improved.
In the paper, we often refer to the case of an increasing hazard rate. This
assumption holds for many well-known distributions like the normal distrib-
ution and the uniform distribution. Less clear-cut results can be derived for
non-monotonic hazard rates. However, not all ndings are based on an in-
creasing hazard rate. In particular, Proposition 3 on the implementability of
given e¤ort levels does not impose any restriction on the shape of the hazard
rate.
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Condition (9) shows that a bonus pool can be less e¤ective if the convo-
lution g becomes very at compared to the initial density f . In that case,
incentives are rather small under a bonus pool for given bonus payments.
Hence, the bonus pool will only dominate individual bonus contracts if the
comparative advantage of nancing incentives for all workers together via K
exceeds the disadvantage of a small g (0).
Throughout the paper we assumed that the performance measures xi (ei)
are veriable. Skipping this assumption without adding supplementary as-
sumptions like repeated interaction or third-party contracting would render
the use of individual bonuses impossible whereas bonus pools still work due
to their self-commitment property, which has been highlighted by Malcomson
(1984).
Finally, one can ask whether our results are robust to the formulation of
the moral-hazard problem used in this paper. As a robustness check, we can
switch from the state-space formulation to the parameterized distribution for-
mulation, where e¤ort choice shifts probability mass over possible outcomes
(e.g., Hart and Holmstrom 1987, 78).18 We can show that the advantage of
pooling bonus payments in situations with a nancially constrained employer
also holds under this alternative modeling of our moral-hazard problem.19
Bonus contracts have the benecial characteristic that the performance
target or threshold can be used by the employer as an e¤ective instrument
to ne-tune incentives. Since the threshold does not only inuence workers
incentives but also the probability that a bonus payment occurs and, hence,
the magnitude of worker rents the employer has to trade o¤ both e¤ects
when choosing the optimal threshold. In case of a bonus-pool contract, the
employer faces a similar optimization problem. The central result of this
paper has shown that for a wide class of probability distributions a bonus
pool o¤ers a better solution to the trade o¤ than individual bonus contracts.
18We thank a referee for pointing to this alternative.
19See the online appendix for details.
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Appendix
Workersequilibrium e¤orts under the optimal bonus-pool contract:
Suppose the employer uses a bonus pool in combination with relative-perfor-
mance evaluation. That is, worker i receives payment w (xi   xj) with w :
R! [0;1) being non-decreasing and xk  xk (ek) (k = i; j) according to
(1). For a given scheme w (x1   x2), worker 1 maximizes
EU1 (e1) = E[w (x1   x2)]  c (e1)
=
Z 1
 1
w (e1   e2 + t) g (t) dt  c (e1)
where g denotes the density of 1 2. Using integration by substitution and
symmetry of g (recall that the i are i.i.d.) we obtain
EU1 (e1) =
Z 1
 1
w (v) g (e1   e2   v) dv   c (e1) :
Similarly, worker 2s objective function reads as
EU2 (e2) =
Z 1
 1
w (v) g (e2   e1   v) dv   c (e2) :
We assume that an equilibrium in pure strategies exists and is characterized
by the rst-order conditions20Z 1
 1
w (v) g0 (e1   e2   v) dv = c0 (e1)
and
Z 1
 1
w (v) g0 (e2   e1   v) dv = c0 (e2) :
Since workers are homogeneous, we concentrate on the characterization of
symmetric equilibria,21 leading to e1 = e2. Inserting the symmetry condition
20Pure-strategy equilibria will exist if the cost of e¤ort function is su¢ ciently steep
and the density g su¢ ciently at so that the workers objective functions are concave
in the relevant range; see, e.g., Lazear and Rosen (1981), p. 845, Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz
(1983), p. 29. See Wolfstetter (1999, p. 305), Schöttner (2008) and Gürtler (2011) for
su¢ cient conditions that guarantee existence. Of course, existence can be proved for given
specications of the noise distribution.
21Symmetric equilibria seem to be most plausible since workers are completely homoge-
neous. The symmetric equilibrium is unique. However, in our general setting we cannot
exclude the existence of additional asymmetric equilibria.
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e1 = e2 =: e into the rst-order conditions yields22
c0 (e) =  
Z 1
 1
w (v) g0 (v) dv: (10)
In the next step, we will show that the employer can at least weakly
improve the relative-performance scheme w by switching to the alternative
scheme
w (v) =
(
0 if v  0
w (v)  w ( v) otherwise, (11)
which is non-negative, non-decreasing and, moreover, satises w (v)  w (v)
for all v. Integration by substitution and the symmetry of g yieldZ 1
 1
w (v)g0 (v) dv =
Z 1
0
w (v) g0 (v) dv  
Z 1
0
w ( v) g0 (v) dv
=
Z 1
0
w (v) g0 (v) dv +
Z  1
0
w (v) g0 ( v) dv
=
Z 1
0
w (v) g0 (v) dv +
Z 0
 1
w (v) g0 (v) dv =
Z 1
 1
w (v) g0 (v) dv:
Hence, from (10) and the fact that w (v)  w (v) we see that replacing
scheme w by scheme w leads to the implementation of the same e¤ort level
e at weakly lower costs for the employer. This useful result sheds light on the
optimal distribution of a bonus pool: the best an employer can do is paying
zero to a worker that is weakly outperformed by his co-worker.
The result also gives clear advice to the employer how to behave in case
of the bonus-pool contract (bH ; bL; ) dened in Section 3 if a tie occurs, i.e.,
if jx1 (e1)  x2 (e2)j  . If the performance measure xi (ei) is unveriable,
the employer has to pay out the full bonus pool even in case of a tie in order
to meet Malcomsons (1984) self-commitment property; otherwise he would
opportunistically claim that state of the world that leads to the lowest labor
costs. Following the equal-sharing rule of Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983), pp.
22g0 ( v) =  g0 (v) due to the symmetry of g.
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30-32, the payment to worker i would read as
w (v) =
8>><>>:
bL if v <  
bL+bH
2
if    v  
bH if v > 
(12)
with v = xi   xj. However, in the given setting with measure xi (ei) being
veriable, relative performance pay need not satisfy the self-commitment
property. Instead, the employer should replace incentive scheme (12) by
the alternative scheme (11) to implement equilibrium e¤ort e at lower costs.
Thus, we obtain
w (v) =
(
0 if v  
bH   bL if v > 
and
c0 (e) =  
Z 1
 1
w (v) g0 (v) dv = (bH   bL) g () :
Proof of Proposition 1:
(a) Objective function (5) shows that the employer prefers the gap 
that maximizes r () in order to minimize expected implementation costs for
a certain e¤ort level e. Then for given , the employer implements optimal
e¤ort e that solves (5) by ne-tuning incentives via bH according to (4). If r
is monotonically increasing, then  =  is optimal. An (1998) and Bagnoli
and Bergstrom (2005) show that log-concavity of a density function implies
that this density has an increasing hazard rate, leading to  = .
(b) The proof uses the following auxiliary result:
Lemma 1 The global maximum of the convolution g is attained at zero.
Proof Recall that 1 and 2 are i.i.d. with density f . In view of the assump-
tion that 1   2 has a continuous density g, g() =
R1
 1 f()f(   ) d for
every  2 R, see, e.g., Mood et al. (1974), pp. 185-186, for the convolution
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formula. Applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality leads to23
g () =
Z 1
 1
f () f (   ) d 
sZ 1
 1
[f ()]2 d
sZ 1
 1
[f (   )]2 d
=
Z 1
 1
[f ()]2 d = g (0) for all . 
If the employer has limited wealthK he will face the additional constraint
bH  K, which, by (4), is equivalent to
c0 (e)  Kg () : (13)
Since c0 is strictly increasing, there exists   0 satisfying (13) if and only if
e 2 [0; e] where e with c0(e) = Kg(0) denes the maximally implementable
e¤ort level according to Lemma 1. Since r() is increasing and the employer
has to solve (5), for any e¤ort level e 2 (0; e] that he wants to implement
he chooses, if possible, the largest corresponding  that satises (13). The
condition limjj!1 f() = 0 implies that lim!1 g () = 0 and, hence, that
the right-hand side of (13) goes to zero as  ! 1. It follows that for every
e 2 (0; e], there exists a largest  satisfying (13), and for this , (13) must
be binding, so that  coincides with (e) as dened in Proposition 1(b). In
view of (5), the optimal e¤ort e maximizes e  c0(e)=r((e)). 
Proof of Proposition 2:
According to An (1998) and Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005), r will be
monotonically increasing if f is log-concave.
(a) We show strict improvement for the case of a strictly increasing haz-
ard rate r; proving weak dominance for an increasing hazard rate proceeds
analogously. According to (5) and (8), any e¤ort level e 2 (0; ] can be
implemented at a lower cost under a bonus-pool contract compared to an
individual bonus contract if24
max
0
g ()
1 G () >
f (   e)
1  F (   e) , max0 r () > r (   e) :
23The step from line 1 to line 2 uses the fact that
R x
x
y (x  ) dx = R x 
x  y (x) dx.
24(5) describes the employers maximization problem for both workers.
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Let  := supfx 2 R : F (x) < 1g. Using the convolution formula g () =R1
0
f (+ ) f () d (e.g., Mood et al. 1974, p. 185) we obtain for all  2
[0; )25
r () =
g ()
1 G () =
R1
0
f (+ ) f () d
1  R1
0
F (+ ) f () d
=
R  
0
r (+ ) [1  F (+ )] f () dR  
0
[1  F (+ )] f () d
>
R  
0
r () [1  F (+ )] f () dR  
0
[1  F (+ )] f () d
= r ()
where the inequality follows from the strict monotonicity of r. Thus, com-
bining e¤ort e with the gap  =    e under a bonus pool leads to strictly
lower implementation costs compared to individual bonus contracts.
(b) It was shown in the proof of Proposition 1(b) that the bonus-pool
contract implementing e at minimal costs has the gap (e) as dened in
Proposition 2(b). Under two individual bonus contracts, the employer can
use wealth K=2 for paying the bonus b^H to each worker. Combining the
employers limited-liability condition K=2  b^H and incentive constraint (7)
yields that c0 (e)  f (^   e)K=2must hold for implementing e under individ-
ual bonus contracts. Since r is increasing and limjj!1 f () = 0, objective
function (8) shows that the optimal quota for implementing e at lowest cost is
given by ^(e) as dened in Proposition 2(b). In view of (5) and (8), the bonus
pool has lower implementation costs if and only if r((e)) > r(^(e)  e). 
Proof of Proposition 3:
(a) Dene  and (e) by
 := Kg(0); (e) := max
^e
K
2
f(^   e):
It was shown in the proof of Proposition 1(b) that e¤ort e can be implemented
by a bonus-pool contract if and only if c0(e)  . It was shown in the proof
25See Miravete (2005), p. 1358, on a similar proof for the sum of two random variables,
i + j .
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of Proposition 2(b) that e¤ort e can be implemented by individual bonus
contracts if and only if c0(e)  (e). The function  is increasing. To see
this let 0  e1 < e2 and let ^1  e1 be such that K2 f(^1   e1) = (e1). Let
^2 = ^1   e1 + e2. Then ^2  e2 and since e2 > e1, ^2 > ^1. Therefore,
(e2)  K
2
f(^2   e2) = K
2
f(^1   e1) = (e1):
It now follows that there exists e0 2 [0;1] so that (e)   if 0  e < e0,
and (e)   if e0 < e <1. This proves (a1) and (a2).
(b) The claim directly follows from the considerations in the proofs of
Propositions 1(b) and 2(b). The thresholds that solve both sides of condition
(9) are nite due to limjj!1 f () = 0. 
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Online Appendix
An Illustrating Example on the Dominance of Bonus Pools
To illustrate the arguments of Proposition 2 and the magnitude by which
the bonus-pool contract may outperform the bonus contract, we consider
a specic distribution with strictly increasing hazard rate. We concentrate
on the case of ^;  2 [0; ] to condense our arguments. Suppose that the
i (i = 1; 2) are uniformly distributed over [0; 1], so that f () = 1 and
F () = , and let  2 [0; 1). Furthermore, we assume that c (ei) = e3i =3
( > 0) with  being su¢ ciently large to guarantee interior solutions.
For the optimal bonus contract (b^H ; 0; ^
), the employer maximizes
2 

ei +
1
2
  e2i (1  ^ + ei)

;
leading to ^ = . The employer implements e¤ort
e =
1
3
q

 
 (1  )2 + 3  (1  )
for both workers via
b^H =
1
9
q

 
 (1  )2 + 3  (1  )2 ;
yielding expected prot
 =
4
27

1
2


 
 (1  )2 + 3 32   (1  )9
2
+ (1  )2 

+ 1;
which is strictly positive.26
In order to compute the optimal bonus-pool contract (bH ; 0; 
),
we rst have to construct the density g. The composed random variable
 := 1 2 can be either negative with 1    0 or positive with 0 <   1.
Furthermore, recall that 0  1  1 and 0  2  1,   1  1+ . Thus,
26 > 1=[ (2 + )] guarantees that    e 2 (0; 1).
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0  1  1 +  if  1    0, and   1  1 if 0 <   1. Applying the
convolution formula yields
g () =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1+R
0
f (1) f (1   ) d1 if  1    0
1R

f (1) f (1   ) d1 if 0 <   1
0 otherwise
=
8>><>>:
1 +  if  1    0
1   if 0 <   1
0 otherwise.
since f (1) = 1;81. The cdf G is obtained by integrating g and using the
fact that G ( 1) = 0 and G (1) = 1:
G () =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if  <  1
 + 
2
2
+ 1
2
if  1    0
   2
2
+ 1
2
if 0 <   1
1 if  > 1:
The employer thus maximizes
2 

ei +
1
2
  e2i
1
2
(1  )

;
which gives  = ,
e =
1
(1  ) and b

H =
1
(1  )3 ;
leading to expected prot
 =
1
(1  ) + 1:
(At the second stage, given  =  and bH = 1=
 
(1  )3 , worker is
reaction curve, ei (ej), is implicitly described by
e2i =
8<:
1
(1 )3  (1  ei + ej + ) if ei > ej + 
1
(1 )3  (1 + ei   ej   ) if ei  ej + ;
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which leads to
ei (ej) =
8>><>>:
1
2
r
1
(1 )3

1
(1 )3 + 4 (1 +  + ej)

  1
(1 )3

if ei > ej + 
1
2
r
1
(1 )3

1
(1 )3 + 4 (1     ej)

+ 1
(1 )3

if ei  ej + :
In the upper case, ei (ej) and ei = ej +  intersect at ~ej = 1
q
1
(1 )3   . In
the lower case, an intersection between ei (ej) and ei = ej +  will exist if
and only ifs
1
(1  )3 

1
(1  )3  + 4 (1  ( + ej))

= 2 (ej + )  1
(1  )3  > 0:
(14)
In addition, we need
1
(1  )3  + 4 (1  ( + ej))  0: (15)
Combining both conditions yields
1
2 (1  )3 2 <  + ej 
1
4 (1  )3 2 + 1; (16)
which requires that  > 1=[2 (1  ) 32 ]. Condition (16) is satised for ej = e
if  is su¢ ciently large. Thus, we assume  to be su¢ ciently large so that
an intersection is guaranteed. Solving ei (ej) = ej +  (described by (14)) for
ej gives ej = 1
q
1
(1 )3     ~ej.
To sum up, the reaction curve ei (ej) starts with a positive slope at ej = 0
(see the upper case). It intersects with ei = ej+ at ej = ~ej and then proceeds
with a negative slope (see the lower case).27 The reaction curve ends where
condition (15) holds with equality (i.e., at ej = 14(1 )32 + 1  ). Mirroring
27The shape of the workersreaction curves is typical of contest or relative-compensation
games. First, it reects strategic complements and then switches to strategic substitutes.
See, e.g., Wärneryd [Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 33 (2000), 145158]; Yildirim
[Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 51 (2005), 213227]; Konrad [Strategy and Dynamics
in Contests. 2009. Oxford University Press, New York], p. 46.
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ei (ej) against the 45-degree line gives worker js reaction curve, ej (ei). Both
reaction curves intersect in the symmetric equilibrium with ei = ej = e.)
Comparing the solution under the optimal individual bonus contracts
with the solution under the optimal bonus-pool contract leads to the following
results:
Example Suppose noise is uniformly distributed over [0; 1] and workers have
cubic costs c (e) = e3=3. Then r () = 2  r (), 8 > 0, and we obtain
bH > 4b^

H and e
 > 2e. Moreover,  > . The probability that both
b^H are paid out under the optimal bonus contract, (1  F (   e))2, is larger
than the probability that bH is paid out under the optimal bonus-pool contract,
2  (1 G ()).
Proof Using the expressions for the optimal e¤ort levels, we have
e   2e = 3 + 2(1  )
2   2(1  )p2(1  )2 + 3
3(1  ) > 0;
showing that e > 2e. Hence, by (7) and (4),
4b^H = (2e
)2 < (e)2 = bH g() < b

H :
To prove that  > , we only have to compare
 = 2 

ei +
1
2
  e2i (1   + ei)

with
 = 2 

ei +
1
2
  e2i
1
2
(1  )

:
The two expressions show that under a bonus-pool contract the employer
can always implement the same e¤ort level at lower cost compared to the
bonus contract. As e > 2e points out, the employer is even better o¤ by
implementing much more e¤ort under a bonus-pool contract.
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We have
2  (1 G ()) = (1  )2
=
1
9
 
5 (1  )2+ 4
9
(1  )
q

 
 (1  )2
<
1
9
 
5 (1  )2 + 3+ 4
9
(1  )
q

 
 (1  )2 + 3
= (1  F (   e))2 : 
The example shows that the major idea of creating incentives via a bonus
contract and a bonus-pool contract is very similar. In both cases, the em-
ployer chooses a large threshold to minimize expected implementation costs.
In order to restore worker motivation, the employer has to combine this
quota with a su¢ ciently high bonus payment. Under the optimal bonus-pool
contract, incentive pay is considerably higher than under individual bonus
contracts (i.e., bH > 4b^

H). Since the production technology is the same un-
der either contract but expected implementation costs are lower under the
bonus pool due to r () = 2  r (), 8 > 0, the optimal bonus pool yields
implemented e¤ort that is more than twice as high as that under the optimal
bonus contract (e > 2e).
When choosing the optimal threshold for the bonus pool, the employer
faces the following trade-o¤: A large threshold minimizes (i) the probabil-
ity of paying out the bonus pool (implementation-cost e¤ect) but also (ii)
the workers incentives, since g () decreases in  > 0 (incentive e¤ect).
However, this trade-o¤ is absent under a bonus contract in this example
since f is a constant so that a large quota does not inuence workers in-
centives. Consequently, the employer chooses the maximum possible quota
under the optimal bonus contract. He chooses the same threshold under the
optimal bonus-pool contract because the implementation-cost e¤ect strictly
dominates the incentive e¤ect. Despite the trade-o¤, the optimal bonus-pool
contract outperforms the optimal bonus contract, which is indicated by the
large implemented e¤ort and the relatively low probability of paying out the
bonus pool (i.e., (1  F (   e))2 > 2  (1 G ())).28
28We have disregarded the fact that, under the optimal bonus contract, the employer
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The comparison of the prots clearly shows the superiority of the bonus
pool (i.e.,  > ). Inserting numbers for the parameters of the example
demonstrates the magnitude of this superiority. If, for example,  = 0:3
and  = 1:5, then   1:33 and   1:95, that is, the optimal bonus-
pool contract is more protable than the optimal bonus contract by about
47 percent. If  = 0:5 and  = 2:7, then   1:25 and   1:74
and, hence, the bonus-pool contract still outperforms the bonus contract by
about 39 percent. These examples point out that switching from the optimal
bonus contract to the optimal bonus-pool contract can increase an employers
expected prots considerably.29
Parameterized Distribution Formulation
We consider a scenario in which the employer has only limited capital K
and show that a bonus-pool contract can again strictly outperform individual
bonus contracts.
Let the two workers choose binary e¤orts e 2 feL; eHg with eL < eH . The
corresponding e¤ort costs are c (eL) = 0 < c := c (eH). We assume that it
always pays for the employer to implement eH instead of eL.30 The veriable
performance measure xi follows a probability distribution that depends on
the workers e¤ort choice. Let P (xjjek) = Pjk with j = 1; : : : ;m and k =
L;H denote the probability that the performance measure of a worker leads
to realization xj given that the worker chose e¤ort ek. We assume that
x1 < x2 <    < xm and PjH < PjL for all j 6= m; and PmH > PmL so
has to pay out one of the two bonuses with probability 2F (   e) [1 F (   e)], which
even strengthens our argument.
29For the case of an increasing hazard rate, Poblete and Spulber (2012, Proposition 2)
suggest to compensate each worker according to maxfxi (ei)   r; 0g for some r  0. We
can show for our example that the optimal bonus-pool contract also leads to higher prots
compared to this contract.
30This simplifying assumption is often made to get rid of further cases that do not really
add to the analysis.
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that the distribution P (xjjeH) dominates the distribution P (xjjeL) within
the meaning of rst-order stochastic dominance.31 As before, we assume
that workers are protected by limited liability (i.e., negative wages are not
feasible) and that each worker has a zero reservation value so that we can
ignore the workersparticipation constraint in the following. To sum up, in
the given setting the employer wants to choose the incentive scheme that
implements eH at minimal costs.
We start with the analysis of the optimal individual bonus contracts.
Since both workers are identical, we can focus on the decision problem of one
of them. Let b^j  0 denote the bonus payment to a worker if his performance
measure takes the value xj (j = 1; : : : ;m). The incentive constraint for
implementing eH reads as32
mX
j=1
b^j  PjH   c 
mX
j=1
b^j  PjL ,
mX
j=1
b^j (PjH   PjL)  c:
Hence, the optimal individual bonus contract (b^1; : : : ; b^

m) that implements
eH at lowest costs is described by
b^j = 0 for all j 6= m; and b^m =
c
PmH   PmL :
The maximal payment to both workers, 2b^m, is not allowed to exceed the
employers capital, K, so that the optimal individual bonus contract will
only be feasible if the employers limited-liability condition
c
PmH   PmL 
K
2
(17)
is satised.
If the employer is allowed to pool the bonus payments for the two work-
ers, individual payments can be made contingent on the realizations of both
workersperformance measures. Again, we can focus on the situation of one
31Skipping the assumption PjH < PjL;8j 6= m; would only strengthen our results.
32As usual we assume that the worker chooses the higher e¤ort level when being indif-
ferent between eH and eL.
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of the workers. Let bij denote the bonus payment to a worker if his perfor-
mance measure has the realization xi and that of his co-worker the realization
xj, i; j 2 f1; : : : ;mg. The incentive constraint for implementing eH for each
worker i.e., the Nash equilibrium condition that the worker does not want
to deviate from eH given that his co-worker chooses eH is given by
mX
i=1
 
(PiH   PiL)
mX
j=1
bij  PjH
!
 c:
Thus, a bonus-pool contract given by (bij) leads to high e¤ort by each worker
at minimal expected costs if and only if bij = 0 for all i < m and all j, and
mX
j=1
bmj  PjH = c
PmH   PmL : (18)
A wealth-constrained employer must be able to pay the bonuses bmj to the
workers under any pair of realizations xi and xj. Even in the worst case the
employer must have enough capital to pay the respective bonuses. Hence, to
minimize the maximal possible cost, it is optimal to choose bmj such that total
labor costs are identical for any pair (xi; xj). The bonus bmm has to be paid
twice if both workersperformance measures take the highest realization xm,
whereas in all other situations we have at most one positive bonus payment.
It is, therefore, optimal for the employer to choose, for some b, bmj = b
 for
all j 6= m, and bmm = 12b at the left-hand side of equation (18), leading to
m 1X
j=1
b  PjH + 1
2
b  PmH = c
PmH   PmL , b
 =
c
(PmH   PmL)
 
1  1
2
PmH
 :
This optimal bonus pool will only be feasible under a wealth-constrained
employer if
b  K , c
PmH   PmL  K

1  1
2
PmH

(19)
The comparison of (17) and (19) shows that 1   1
2
PmH >
1
2
, PmH < 1
is true. Hence, there exist values of the employers capital K for which the
optimal bonus-pool contract is feasible and implements eH whereas the opti-
mal individual bonus contract is not feasible, but the opposite case that the
40
individual bonus contract is feasible and the bonus-pool contract is infeasible
can never happen.33
33The employers expected labor costs are identical under both contracts as the two
incentive constraints are binding.
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